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FINDING THE CONTRACT IN
CONTRACTS FOR LAW, FORUM
AND ARBITRATION
William J. Woodward, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
Pick up a conflict of laws text or most law review articles and you will
find considerable attention lavished on both choice-of-law and choice-of-
forum clauses in business dealings. Both are nearly ubiquitous in modem
business relationships of all kinds, from carefully negotiated contracts
among large businesses to mass market forms that businesses promulgate1
en masse to consumers. Both kinds of clauses have received an
extraordinary amount of attention in the conflict of laws literature and the
attention heaped on them is probably well-earned.
Several different jurisdictions usually have the power to decide a given
contract dispute.2 Absent an enforceable choice of forum clause, a party
* Professor of Law, Temple University. © 2005 All rights reserved. Please do not quote
or excerpt without written permission. Thanks to Jean Braucher, Jeff Dunoff, Stewart
Macaulay, Bill Whitford, Candace Zierdt, and particularly to my colleague Rick Greenstein
for their helpful comments on this paper. Thanks also to my research assistants, Vinnie
Gallo, Natasha Gekht, Margaret Hunsicker, Adam Kerns, and Justin Rymer for their
research help.
1. Professor Radin distinguishes between the kinds of contracts that are founded on true
consent by the bound parties and the forms promulgated by businesses that purport to bind
without any semblance of consent. Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding
Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125 (2000). Because whether such forms bind consumers and
small businesspeople to choices of law, forum, and arbitration is one of the questions being
examined here, I will try to avoid putting the rabbit into the hat by calling these business
relationships "contracts." See also Arthur A. Leff, Contract As Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV.
131 (1970).
2. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The Internationalization of Law and Legal Practice: Forum
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can shop for the most beneficial forum in which to litigate (by simply filing
suit there) when the contractual relationship has broken down. This can
yield benefits for the plaintiff in the form of geographic advantage or local
favoritism over the defendant or, in more subtle forms such as the law a
tribunal will apply to the problem, or civil procedure limitations endemic to
the chosen forum. Absent a binding choice of law clause, parties to a
contract face the prospect of litigating under a set of legal rules that was not
within their frame of reference when they made their underlying contract.
In both cases, the commercial uncertainty can decrease the value of the
exchange itself.
The well-deserved attention to such provisions has generally come
from the conflict of laws literature and has focused on the consequences of
such purported agreements, once they are made. Assuming a choice of
forum agreement, under what circumstances must a court enforce it and
under what circumstances might a court refuse enforcement? What are the
existing and optimal limitations to the parties' contractual power to choose
their law within their contract? Is the enforcement of choice-of-law
clauses, assuming they are agreements, subject nonetheless to exceptions?
These are questions that pit the autonomy of the parties to manage their
own affairs ("party autonomy") against the jurisdiction's own power either
to exercise jurisdiction over them despite their contrary agreement, or to
use the law of its choosing to determine their dispute.
What has been largely missing from the work thus far is a focus on a
preceding set of threshold questions: 1) whether the parties' purported
agreement to a choice-of-law or a choice-of-forum clause ought, as a
matter of contract law, to be enforceable and 2) under whose contract law
should that question be answered. These questions focus on an individual's
autonomy to contract or not to contract, and on the State's legal recognition
(typically, as a matter of economics or commerce) of private ordering. The
conflict of laws scholarship and commentary have assumed the contract
law questions were relatively settled in this context and proceeded from
there; the contracts literature has, by and large, simply ignored the
threshold contract questions which might demand different treatment in
some contexts than in others.
The rapidly developing pace of globalization has made both choice-of-
law and choice-of-forum clauses far more important economically than
Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REv. 553, 554-55 (1989) [hereinafter The
Internationalization of Law and Legal Practice].
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they were thirty years ago. These same forces have brought into sharp
focus the need to consider sensible mechanisms to limit the uses to which
such provisions might be put. Two recent developments show why a focus
on the contracts questions is important.
First, we now see the aggressive use of choice of law clauses in
consumer and small business settings to a degree unimagined in the late
twentieth century, and this development threatens to undermine the
consumer law states have developed in the last fifty years. To give a
simple example, unconscionability, a major tool in contract policing, is
most often put to work when a consumer or small business has received
onerous terms through a vendor's form. Very few would think that a
vendor could avoid an unconscionability challenge by simply adding a
"waiver of unconscionability" to that very form. Yet, a modem drafter
might well accomplish the same thing by "choosing" the law of a place
with weaker consumer protection and arguing that, as a matter of contract,
the customer is bound by that "choice of law." We now find businesses
pressing this argument in litigation in at least one court, and, probably,
countless arbitrators have accepted the argument.
Because vendor forms are promulgated en masse, the effect of judicial
decisions recognizing this power is the replacement of one state's set of
unconscionability norms by another set; that of the state of the drafter's
choosing. And if this can be done with unconscionaibility, it can probably
be done with any state contract rules protecting consumers and small
businesses. Some recent cases suggest that wholesale displacement of a
state's consumer and small business protections may be a real danger.
If this is happening, the evidence suggests that it is taking place
without either advocates or courts understanding the full range of
possibilities that contract law might offer-very few courts focus on the
question whether the choice-of-law clause is itself enforceable as a matter
of contract law. This, in turn, is due to the fact that these problems are
thought of as conflict of laws problems, not as contract problems, and the
intellectual complexity that comes with conflict of laws has effectively
hidden the contract that is at the core of these provisions. We need to
understand the law that applies to these provisions better: badly-analyzed
judicial decisions will have ripple effects for years in unreported arbitration
decisions and in negotiations that inevitably accompany dispute resolution.
In addition, a better understanding of the workings of these provisions is
essential for conscious, transparent policymaking going forward.
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The second development underscoring the importance of the contract
questions in this area is connected to choice of forum clauses, again
showing up increasingly in vendors' forms. Both a recent Hague
Convention 3  and the American Law Institute's Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal
Statute4 address judgments entered in violation of agreements to litigate in
an exclusive forum specified in the underlying contracts. In both cases,
and with few exceptions, the contractual choice-of-forum provision will
have a great impact on the enforceability of the resulting judgments.
Both of these statements of policy, while not the law anywhere yet,
raise complex issues related to, but distinct from, those raised by the
widespread use of choice-of-law clauses in vendor forms. But they have
this in common: choice-of-forum clauses, like choice-of-law clauses, have
been analyzed as conflict of laws provisions and, once again, in the process
the analysis has tended to obscure the contract that is at the core. New
developments on the international front will make understanding the full
richness of these provisions more essential than ever.
A discussion of choice-of-law and forum clauses in business forms
could not be complete without also addressing, at least in summary form,
binding mandatory arbitration ("BMA").5 This is a form of forum
selection6 but the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA" or "Act") makes focus on the contract questions
3. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements (June 30, 2005), available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?
act=conventions.text&cid=98 (last visited November 15, 2005). See infra text at notes 82-
86.
4. The American Law Institute, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments:
Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute, Proposed Foreign Judgments Recognition and
Enforcement Act § 5(b) cmt. f (Final Draft April 11, 2005) [hereinafter ALl International
Judgment Recognition Project]. See infra text at notes 87-90.
5. Professor Speidel correctly observes that "binding mandatory arbitration" is a
misnomer in that it conveys a sense that it is not based on assent but rather is imposed.
Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute Mandatory
Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 1069 (1998). But true assent is surely
missing in most consumer arbitration agreements that are enforced by courts and, therefore,
it's no wonder that the popular sense is different from how arbitration works in theory. I use
the term here because consumer advocates have begun using it as shorthand in efforts to use
the market to change business behavior by urging consumers not to do business with
vendors who use BMA and giving consumers information on those vendors who do not
require it. See generally http://www.givemebackmyrights.com for a website that makes good
use of this shorthand.
6. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11.3 at 481 (4th ed. 2004).
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essential. An arbitration clause triggers the FAA and, with it, a series of
decisions interpreting the Act to broadly favor arbitration and to strongly
preempt state law, even in adhesion contract settings. The Act, and the
decisions interpreting it, specify, however, that state contract law defenses
remain valid; only when a court finds there is an enforceable agreement to
arbitrate does FAA preemption sweep away nearly all other challenges to
BMA. Because of this, the contract law challenges to BMA are far better
developed than they are to choice-of-forum clauses, and looking at them
can inform a discussion of choice-of-forum clauses. In addition, the
arbitration cases occasionally beg the question whose contract law decides
the contractual validity of an arbitration clause? If the form that contains
the arbitration clause also contains a choice-of-law clause, as it usually
does, the analysis becomes complex and, judging by the decisions,
inadequately understood.
That the increased use of choice-of-law, forum, and arbitration clauses
can adversely affect the customers who receive them has been evident for
many years. But these developments may also imperil state consumer and
small business protections more generally. This may be cause for concern
in those states that wish to maintain local control over the protections they
offer to those customers who are on the receiving end of adhesion
contracts.
The conflict of laws lens through which we have observed choice-of-
law and forum clauses gives a very incomplete picture, one that limits the
imagination both of lawyers and of legislatures. This article aims to fix
that by improving our ability to see the legal doctrine under which these
provisions work, and showing how a better understanding can lead to better
policy options for addressing them. The objectives here are very modest:
simply to expose the contract that is at the core of all these provisions.
This proves surprisingly complex because to see the contract issues, one
has to untangle them from the conflict of laws issues. That, in turn,
requires at least a summary understanding of the conflicts principles as
well.
Before proceeding, it is worth underscoring some important limitations
of the analysis. This is largely a doctrinal article and it proceeds on the
assumption that doctrine can have some influence on the outcomes of
litigation. But there are, undoubtedly, far larger forces at work in cases
Winter 2005]
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involving consumer arbitration and related consumer class actions,7 and
any realist will recognize that these forces will reduce (though not
eliminate) the impact of even the best-developed legal argument. 8
7. The positive aspects of class actions-a procedure that both deprives defendants of
illicit gains and offers some remedy to those with legal rights that are individually too small
to prosecute-have been lost in the politics of individualism, "tort reform," and free market.
See Robert S. Safi, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Preserving the Class Mechanism
Under State Law in the Era of Consumer Arbitration, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1715, 1715 (2005)
(highlighting various measures that have been taken to address the class action "problem").
The most recent expression of doubts about class actions was the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1453, 1711-
1715). Banks and other businesses that accidentally overcharge individual customers
pennies of course have a keen interest in avoiding class actions, inasmuch as pennies across
millions of transactions add up quickly. Hence, the lobbying and litigation forces aligned
against class actions are substantial and potentially overwhelming. It may now be the case
that most who recognize the term "class action" associate it with greedy plaintiff's lawyers
rather than with consumer remedies or the removal of a defendant's unjust enrichment.
Courts cannot help being affected by these strong forces.
Consumer arbitration tends to solve the "class action problem" for affected businesses
unless, of course, a court permits a class action to proceed in arbitration. See, e.g., Green
Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 454-55 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
and dissenting in part) (finding that the Federal Arbitration Act did not preclude the South
Carolina Supreme Court's determination that state law would permit class action arbitration
unless the arbitration agreement expressly prohibited such class actions); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984) (refusing to decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act
precludes class action arbitration because the issue was not properly raised by the California
Supreme Court); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005) (holding that
federal law would not preclude a finding that under California law class arbitration may be
appropriate even if the contract contains a class action waiver).
Beyond a possible cultural bias against class actions, most courts seem to believe that
consumer arbitration is itself a positive development, whether it is truly consensual or
imposed via business forms. This may be founded on a belief that this private system
dispenses justice equivalent to that which the courts dispense (there are no verifiable data on
this question one way or the other). It could also be based on a sense that consumer
complaints are unworthy of judicial time. Cf. Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System:
From ADR as Idealistic Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST.
U. L. REv. 927 (2002). In this environment, enforcing a class action waiver and sending a
case to arbitration, may seem the "right" thing to do; noting that the customer brought this
on herself (by "agreeing" to the terms of the form) offers a handy justification that happens
to coincide with the dominant individualist ideology that has grown in our culture since the
1970s.
8. There is also a very practical explanation for a judicial predisposition to enforcing
adhesive arbitration provisions, again having little to do with legal doctrine. Karl Llewellyn
is reported to have said "[tihe whole history of the English constitution could be written in
terms of the pressure of work." RICHARD DANZIG & GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE
CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW 92 (2d ed. 2004). Enforcing an arbitration clause
clears the docket of a pesky consumer case; enforcing such a clause when the claim is
[Vol. 2:1
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Recognition of these larger forces should offer those who bring these cases
a measure of modesty about the receptiveness of courts to well-
developed-even "correct"-legal theories. But while legal doctrine may
be a small weapon against these larger economic and cultural forces,9 one
would have to question the law itself to conclude that better-developed,
well-presented legal arguments will have no impact in individual cases or
on legal development more generally. At a minimum, better-developed
legal doctrine will press courts for decisions that are not conclusory, as so
many in this area seem to be, but are more revealing of the real reasons for
the decision. Over the long run, clearer reasons and better doctrine ought
to push policy in a direction that is better aligned with the interests of those
who are affected by it.
The Article will proceed in two main parts and a short third one. Part
II will introduce the provisions, begin to identify the contract issues that are
beneath the surface and suggest why it is important to understand them
more fully. Part III will then advance a simple methodology for
approaching the provisions. That part will conclude by showing how the
methodology can help us understand an important, recent case that raises
many of the issues addressed here. Finally, Part IV will suggest that
contracts scholars can and should play a far larger role in the development
of our understanding of these provisions.
II. THE CONTRACT HIDDEN IN CONTRACTS CHOOSING LAW AND FORUM
A. CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISIONS
That the parties to a contract could dictate to a judge the law the court
should use to make a judicial decision seems counterintuitive and, perhaps,
lawless. It's no wonder, then, that the law has come to recognize this so-
called "party autonomy" only recently. The history has been developed
extensively elsewhere;' 0 a brief summary here will suffice.
brought as a class action clears the docket of a potentially large (but still pesky) consumer
case.
9. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 63-65 (1984)
(describing the interplay between the development of legal doctrine and societal changes,
including the continued existence and need for well-developed legal doctrine).
10. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Internationalization of Contractual Conflicts Law, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421 (1995); Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory
Solution to a Choice-of-Law Problem, 37 U. KAN. L. REv. 471, 475 (1989); and Friedrich K.
Winter 20051
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The general background against which these contract provisions must
be understood is the legal subject area known as conflict of laws, a
complex and, for many, impenetrable tangle. Early on in the development
of conflict of laws jurisprudence, long before widespread recognition of
enforceable contract provisions choosing law, there was comparatively
little complexity: courts originally proceeded from the idea that the
applicable law in a given case was, simply, the law of the forum. The
problem this presented in the United States, with its many state
jurisdictions having differing views of appropriate legal norms, was forum
shopping and the possibility that the outcome of a dispute would be
governed not by broad, generally applicable legal principles but by the
tactics of one party or the other in bringing the litigation into a "favorable"
jurisdiction.
The classical conflict of laws system arose to neutralize this forum
shopping." The conflicts rules that developed functioned as "pointers,"
ideally, pointing in a determinate direction to the applicable substantive law
once the facts at hand were fed into the rule. If the system worked in an
optimal way, it would not matter where a case were litigated because the
conflicts rules everywhere would point to the same applicable law.
Of course, there were problems that caused reality to diverge from the
ideal. First, many versions of these rules seemed sharp-edged but were, in
fact, subject to argument," and those that were not sharp-edged, but
required an exercise of judgment, also suffered from indeterminacy. 13
Which types of rules are better for the job remains in dispute in the
conflicts literature. 14 Second, as is typical in our federal system, not all
Juenger, A Page of History, 35 MERCER L. REv. 419 (1981).
11. The Internationalization of Law and Legal Practice, supra note 2, at 558-59.
12. For example, would the "place of contracting" in an interstate contract depend on the
location of the offeror, the offeree, the place where the negotiation took place, or some other
place? See SCOLES ETAL., supra note 6, § 18.14.
13. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, Survival ofActions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the
Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 128, 169 (1963)
(advocating an interest analysis approach to conflict-of-laws questions); The
Internationalization of Law and Legal Practice, supra note 2, at 559 (noting that the First
Restatement's "rigid choice-of-law rules ... did not prevent courts from indulging in home-
town justice" with the use of "escape devices-such as characterization, renvoi, and the
public policy reservation"); Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum
Shopping, International and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 559, 564 (2002)
(concluding that plaintiffs have the ability to choose pro-recovery fora based on non-choice-
of-law factors because of the malleable nature of most state conflict systems).
14. See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, The Need for a Comparative Approach to Choice-of-
[Vol. 2:1
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states agreed on the same rules. 15 Thus, a litigant could "shop" for a state
with a conflicts rule that would point to law that would favor the client's
case-a more complicated reiteration of the original forum shopping
problem the conflicts system was designed to solve. To exacerbate this
problem, these state conflicts principles must, following Erie, 16 be applied
by federal courts sitting in given states. 17 Calls to "federalize" the conflict
of laws rules' 8 have gone largely unheeded, though this same problem
largely stands behind the American Law Institute's project for a federal
statute governing enforcement of international judgments.' 9
While this state of affairs presents serious problems for accident
victims and their defendants, it is worse when contracts give rise to the
controversy. This same indeterminacy can upset finely-tuned calculations
of risk and benefits engaged in by those who do transactional work. This is
most likely to be true in negotiated contracts between parties who both
have much at stake in the deal. The value of any exchange is, in part, a
function of the legal regime under which it is made. If that legal regime
can be made to vary-long after the deal is struck, when a dispute has
developed-through forum shopping, a party might lose-or win-benefits
that were not part of the deal that was made. Whatever might be said of the
need for a determinate set of pointers that will not vary by jurisdiction in
non-contract cases, the need is considerably greater in negotiated contract
cases when the value of the exchange is, in part, determined by
assumptions about the law that will apply to it.
Law Problems, 73 TuiL. L. REv. 1309, 1315-17 (1999) (comparing the multilateralist and
unilateralist approaches to choice-of-law problems); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 320-22 (1990) (rejecting both the First Restatement and the ad
hoc, case-by-case approaches and advocating the development of canons to determine
conflict-of-law questions based on shared policies among states); Douglas Laycock, Equal
Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law,
92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 250-56 (1992) (approaching the conflict-of-laws question from a
constitutional standpoint).
15. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 6, § 2.20; Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in
the American Courts in 2003: Seventeenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 9, 26-27
(2004).
16. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
17. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
18. See Laycock, supra note 14; Donald T. Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of
Law, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1715 (1992).
19. ALl International Judgment Recognition Project, supra note 4, Introduction: National
Law in the International Arena.
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There is thus a substantial economic case to be made for giving
contracting parties the ability to predict with greater accuracy the law that
will apply to their transaction. Since the conflict of laws system cannot
deliver that level of certainty, the case for permitting the parties themselves
to settle the matter through a contract provision is great.2° What is
surprising historically is that judicial recognition of the parties' need and
creation of their power to settle the applicable law by contract took so long.
It is clear that, despite the view that permitting parties to choose their
law by contract was permitting them to do a "legislative act,",21 the idea that
party intent ought to control the law to be applied to a contract had earned
at least some judicial recognition in the United States in the nineteenth
century22 and at least some academic recognition by the 1930s. 23  While
the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws did not recognize so-called "party
autonomy, '' 24 courts increasingly accepted the idea, and in 1952, Article 1
of the Uniform Commercial Code explicitly embraced contractual choice-
of-law as a matter of state statute. U.C.C. § 1-105 provided that:
20. It is very easy to recognize the predictive consequences of being able to choose law
by contract. See Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of
Law, 37 GA. L. REv. 363, 403 (2003) (arguing that parties prefer choice-of-law clauses
because they reduce both uncertainty costs and the need for litigation). If such a provision
is enforced, it eliminates litigation on the very broad question of "what jurisdiction's law
controls the contract."
It is, however, very easy to overstate the benefits of eliminating this one issue in the
context of real litigation. In that contentious setting, a choice of law clause could never be
the panacea that some assume. An enforceable choice-of-law clause does not (and probably
cannot) settle questions such as 1) what legal regime within a jurisdiction will apply (e.g.,
U.C.C. Article 2A (true leases) or Article 9 (secured transactions), or U.C.C. Article 2
(goods) or general contract law (services)); 2) what rules will apply within that legal regime
to the dispute (e.g., rejection versus revocation of acceptance in U.C.C. Article 2); 3) how a
trier of fact will see the facts; 4) who the judge will be and how she will interpret the law;
and 5) (most importantly) what 'the dispute will eventually be about. Granted that
enforcement of a choice of law clause reduces some uncertainty about the outcome in a
future dispute (and thereby generates some economic value), but in the context of litigation
uncertainty, an enforceable choice of law clause remedies only a small part of the uncertain
future for a planner.
21. See Joseph H. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARV. L. REv.
260, 260 (1910).
22. See Mathias Reimann, Savigny's Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the
Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 571, 575 (1999). As will become evident,
the image sketched by "party autonomy" becomes extremely unrealistic in settings where
choice of law clauses are promulgated en masse to customers.
23. Joseph H. Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 1173 (1935).
24. Reimann, supra note 22. "Party autonomy" is something of a misnomer-parties
have never had unlimited power to bind the courts to their particular choice of law.
[Vol. 2:1
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[W]hen a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to
another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this
state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties.25
It is very likely that codification of this "party autonomy" principle
accelerated both judicial recognition of contractual choice-of-law clauses
and practitioners' use of them. The development was finally recognized in
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, Section 187 (hereinafter
referred to as the "Conflicts Restatement"),26 a provision that a plurality of
jurisdictions now follow,27 but which, when it was developed, probably did
not envision widespread enforcement of choice-of-law clauses in consumer
and small business adhesion contracts.28
Whatever the Restatement's drafters may have had in mind, the use of
choice-of-law clauses in consumer and small business settings carries
25. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1952) (pre-2003 revision).
26. Restatement (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971) (amended 1989)
provides:
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties
will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved
by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in
the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the
state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
27. See Symeonides, supra note 15, at 28 (noting that 39 states have abandoned the lex
loci contractus rule with the majority of these states and a few others adopting the
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 187(2) approach).
28. Comment b to the provision reads:
b. Impropriety or mistake. A choice-of-law provision, like any other contractual
provision, will not be given effect if the consent of one of the parties to its inclusion in the
contract was obtained by improper means, such as by misrepresentation, duress, or undue
influence, or by mistake. Whether such consent was in fact obtained by improper means or
by mistake will be determined by the forum in accordance with its own legal principles. A
factor which the forum may consider is whether the choice-of-law provision is contained in
an "adhesion" contract, namely one that is drafted unilaterally by the dominant party and
then presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis to the weaker party who has no real
opportunity to bargain about its terms. Such contracts are usually prepared in printed form,
and frequently at least some of their provisions are in extremely small print. Common
examples are tickets of various kinds and insurance policies. Choice-of-law provisions
contained in such contracts are usually respected Nevertheless, the forum will scrutinize
such contracts with care and will refuse to apply any choice-of-law provision they may
contain if to do so would result in substantial injustice to the adherent. (emphasis added).
Winter 2005]
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similar advantages of certainty and predictability, particularly for the party
who drafts the form. What is different is that their use there also raises
problems that seriously threaten the complex limitations on contracting that
state legislatures and courts have set into place to protect their residents
against overreaching. 29 A simple example of how this might occur comes
to us from an unreported decision 30 involving an unconscionability attack
on an arbitration clause in the District Court in Tacoma, Washington.
Scheifley v. Capitol One Bank31 was a class action suit where the court
had before it, among other things, the bank's motion to stay the
proceedings and compel arbitration pursuant to a contract. Ms. Scheifley
sought to avoid the arbitration provision on the grounds of
unconscionability, in part, because the arbitration clause also contained a
class action waiver. Unfortunately for Ms. Scheifley, the form also
contained a provision specifying that the law of Delaware controlled the
contract, and a Delaware court had concluded in an earlier case 32 that a
class action waiver did not render an arbitration clause unconscionable
under Delaware law. Judge Ronald Leighton used Delaware law to
conclude that the class action waiver before him was not unconscionable,
acknowledging in the process that, while the result might be different under
Washington law, having agreed to Delaware law, the plaintiff was bound
by Delaware's approach to unconscionability.33
Since Delaware had already settled the unconscionability issue, it
should be obvious that a great deal rested on the choice-of-law clause. As
to that provision contained in the cardholder agreement, District Judge
Ronald Leighton had only this to say:
As an initial matter, the substantive law of Delaware governs this dispute,
including whether or not it must be arbitrated. The cardholder Agreement
expressly so provides:
29. See generally Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role
of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697 (1990).
30. The decision is unavailable on Westlaw and is not in the Reporters. But it appears in
the briefs of banks that cite it for the proposition that it is appropriate to use Delaware law to
decide an out-of-state unconscionability question. How and why the decision (which the
judge had already made the effort to write) disappeared from the public domain, whether
this is evidence of a far wider phenomenon, and whether the phenomenon is one that
structurally favors the repeat players through some form of "private" reporting system is a
topic for another day.
31. No. CV 03-2801RBL (W.D. Wash. filed June 25, 2004).
32. Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1261 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001).
33. Scheifley, No. CV 03-2801RBL, at 4 (citing Edelist, 790 A.2d at 1261).
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This agreement will be governed by the laws of the State of Delaware and
applicable federal laws.
Plaintiff does not directly (and as a practical matter, cannot) attack this
provision . . . . The court does not agree with plaintiff's implicit claim
that Washington law must apply if it is more protective of consumer's
[sic] rights than the law of the agreed upon state.34
There is thus no discussion in the case of how the choice-of-law clause
was presented to the plaintiff, whether it was presented in such a way as to
reduce the likelihood it would be seen or read, the plaintiffs understanding
of the clause or its implications, or any of the other questions that might
ordinarily accompany a challenge, on the basis of assent, to a clause in a
contract. In short, while it is clear that the plaintiff was challenging
whether she was bound by the arbitration provisions of the agreement, her
specific focus on whether she was bound by the choice of Delaware law
clause is not evident.
Scheifley nicely illustrates two interrelated problems which, together,
may diminish the protection customers who live outside of Delaware would
otherwise have. The first is the surprisingly difficult technical problem of
applying both contracts and conflict of laws principles. There are a great
many large credit card banks located in Delaware. It is very evident from
the cases that banks have pressed, with some measure of success, the
applicability of Delaware law in out-of-state litigation settings. It is very
clear from the cases that there is confusion over the correct way to
approach this threshold applicability issue.
The second problem goes far beyond the parties to a dispute like
Scheifley. It is whether giving strong extraterritorial effect to the
unconscionability decisions (or other important policy judgments in the
consumer protection area) of one state (through enforcement of choice-of-
law provisions) is sound policy. In this respect, Judge Leighton's use of
Delaware's unconscionability law in that Washington dispute can stand as
a surrogate for other kinds of consumer protection, and Schiefley as a
metaphor.
Many observers assert that unconscionability and similar doctrines are
such sufficient policing tools that there is no need for other rules.35
34. Scheifley, No. CV 03-2801RBL, at 2-3.
35. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard Form Contracting in
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 456-60 (2002) (describing the three doctrines
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Whether this is true or not, a state's unconscionability cases and doctrine
constitute a central feature of its apparatus for protecting its consumers and
small businesses-perhaps as central or "findamental," as a regulatory
matter, as a state's contract policy can get. In Scheifley, without much
discussion, the court imported Delaware unconscionability law and injected
it into this controversy involving a resident of Washington. In so doing, the
judge overrode whatever the Washington position on the matter might have
been. Perhaps this was correct-a main purpose of this article is to create a
better framework for judging the question-but this federal judge owed to
the lawmakers and citizens of the state in which he sat (or at least to the
parties) a better explanation of why this should be so. If a choice-of-law
clause in an adhesion contract can displace the otherwise-applicable
unconscionability law in a given case, little of a state's other (and mostly
less important) law protecting consumers and small businesses is safe from
this new form of adhesion contract waiver.
B. CHOICE-OF-FORUM PROVISIONS
Parties who actually negotiate choice-of-forum clauses are motivated
by a commercial need similar to that behind choice-of-law clauses; the
main objective probably being to reduce the unpredictable variables that
could accompany a contractual dispute. 36 Here, too, there is probably a
perception that some fora are better than others for litigation 37 and setting
the forum within the contract will reduce the natural-and costly-urge of
one party or the other to "shop" for a forum once a problem arises. Though
there is a superficial similarity to choice-of-law clauses, the law behind
choice-of-forum clauses has a different complexity. 38 Here, the hard non-
contract law question is whether, under a given set of facts, a court that
currently used to police contracts: unconscionability, Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
211(3), and reasonable expectations and suggesting that they are adequate); Erin Ann
O'Hara, Choice of Law for Internet Transactions: The Uneasy Case for Online Consumer
Protection, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1883, 1936 (2005) (arguing that substantive
unconscionability provides a sufficient policing tool for online contracts); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability
Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 757,
841-45 (2004) (advocating that courts increase their use of the unconscionability doctrine
for policing contracts).
36. Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 51, 51-52 (1992) (noting that choice-of-forum clauses create
"orderliness and predictability in contractual relationships").
37. See generally The Internationalization of Law and Legal Practice, supra note 2.
38. See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 6, §§ 11.2-11.7.
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would ordinarily have jurisdiction must refuse to exercise it if the parties
have chosen another jurisdiction as the exclusive forum for resolving their
dispute.
Until at least the 1950s, most courts refused to defer to the parties'
agreement on the grounds that the parties lacked the power to "oust" the
court of its own jurisdiction. 39  This changed dramatically with the
Supreme Court's decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off Shore Co., 4°
holding that an exclusive forum chosen by the parties in an arms-length,
negotiated agreement had to be enforced.41 With Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc. v. Shute,42 the Supreme Court applied the negotiated contract analysis
in the form contract setting and thereby delivered choice-of-forum clauses
to the masses, at least in admiralty settings.
Carnival Cruise Lines involved a personal injury on a cruise ship that
traveled from Los Angeles to Mexico and back. Mrs. Shute had ordered
and paid for the ticket in Arlington, Washington; it was delivered with a
clause specifying Florida as the exclusive jurisdiction for litigating all
disputes.43 The Supreme Court found that the clause was enforceable and
that the District Court in Washington properly dismissed the case after one
was brought there by Mrs. Shute. Justifying this decision, the Supreme
Court noted that the cruise line had a keen interest in keeping all its
litigation in one place,44 that such a clause could reduce uncertainty,4 5 and
39. See, e.g., Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (holding that "agreements in
advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.");
Carbon Black Exp., Inc. v. The SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958) (applying
the "universally accepted rule that agreements in advance of controversy whose object is to
oust the jurisdiction of the courts are contrary to public policy and will not be enforced.");
Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82 F. 508, 510 (6th Cir. 1897)
(holding that a "provision intended to oust the jurisdiction of all state courts is clearly
invalid."); U.S. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 38 F.R.D. 418, 420 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (finding that
a contract clause may not "oust the courts of their jurisdiction"); Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins.
Co., 72 Mass. 174, 184 (1856) (holding that "to allow [jurisdictional rules] to be changed by
the agreement of parties would disturb the symmetry of the law").
40. 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972).
41. The Bremen was a case where the forum was unrelated either to the parties or their
transaction and the underlying agreement arguably called for the application of unrelated
law to the contract. 407 U.S. at 13 n.15. See William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice
of Law: Legislative Choice in an Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REv. 697, 714-15
(2001).
42. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
43. Id. at 587-88.
44. Id. at 593.
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that passengers can actually benefit from such clauses in the form of lower
46prices. Because there was no specific District Court finding of fact, it
rejected the Court of Appeals' position that Mrs. Shute would be physically
and financially incapable of pursuing the litigation in Florida 47 and may
have implied that one party's business location in the selected forum is
enough to defeat such a showing in any event.48 Finally, the Court noted
that "respondents have conceded that they were given notice of the forum
provision and, therefore, presumably retained the option of rejecting the
contract with impunity.
49
It is reasonably clear that because Carnival Cruise Lines was an
admiralty case, its analysis need not be adopted by state courts deciding
whether they should dismiss a case where an adhesion contract specifies a
different exclusive forum.50 The case has been roundly criticized51 and is at
odds with the views expressed by Europeans in international conventions
that are far more protective of consumers.52
Choice-of-forum clauses in forms promulgated to consumers and small
businesses do not represent a collective effort on the part of the parties to
reduce the uncertainty of forum shopping; rather they reflect the drafter's
desire to prescribe where the non-drafter might file suit. While they are
similarly adhesive, choice-of-forum clauses pose a threat of a different
45. Id. at 593-94.
46. Id. at 594.
47. Id. The Supreme Court did not reject the proposition that there was record evidence to
this effect, however. Cf Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 389 (9th Cir. 1990),
rev'd, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
48. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 594.
49. Id. at 595.
50. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 6, § 11.5.
51. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts after
Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REv. 55, 74-78
(1992); Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 49, 62-67 (1995);
Jeffrey A. Liesemer, Carnival's Got the Fun... and the Forum: A New Look at Choice-of-
Forum Clauses and the Unconscionability Doctrine after Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 53 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1025, 1052-59 (1992); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case,
Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27
TEX. INT'L L.J. 323, 342-44 (1992).
52. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 6, § 11.3 at 485; 1968 Brussels Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1998 O.J.
(C 27) 1, 7-8; William W. Park, Illusion and Reality in International Forum Selection, 30
TEX. INT'L L.J. 135, 188-91 (1995) (highlighting European consumer protections with regard
to the waiver of jurisdictional rights and noting that the United States lacks similar
protections).
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character in this context from that which accompanies choice-of-law
clauses. The obvious effect is that the enforceable choice-of-forum clause
commits the customer to a potentially distant jurisdiction either to pursue or
defend a claim. As suggested by Carnival Cruise Lines, this might be a
jurisdiction where the form drafter is located, and has extensive business
and legal ties. Limiting litigation to the forum chosen by the drafter will
change the settlement value of the case in the drafter's favor, perhaps
dramatically, whomever turns out to be the plaintiff. There are several
implications.
First, unless the case is a large one or the "chosen" forum convenient, a
choice-of-forum clause can eliminate a customer's legal claim entirely.
Only in theory can a customer make a cross-country trip to pursue a $100
warranty claim. Moreover, inasmuch as effective legal redress for either
breach of contract or torts creates incentives to product quality53 or to
reasonable care,54 an enforceable choice-of-forum clause can alter those
incentives for the drafter by either reducing the real costs of breach of
contract or tort or eliminating them entirely. This, of course, can result in
harm to other customers through breaches of contract or torts (or low
quality products and low levels of care) that would not have occurred had
the law's incentives been optimal. Finally, in the adhesive business-form
setting, one must question whether the market in fact operates to deliver
price savings to the customer, 55 an assumption made by the Supreme Court
majority in Carnival Cruise Lines.56  This depends on many factors,
including strong competition among businesses so that there might be some
reflection of the business's cost savings due to these provisions in their
57prices.
53. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of
Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 556 (1985) (stating that strict liability provides
incentives for the manufacturer to improve inspection for component defects).
54. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972)
(stating that the Hand Formula provides a quantifiable measure of the standard of reasonable
care, which allows individuals to adjust their level of care accordingly).
55. See Braucher, supra note 51, at 67-68.
56. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 594.
57. If all the competitors have the same provisions, then their price competition is based
on factors other than the clauses. This could, theoretically, bring prices down generally but
the reasons would be based on a judgment that there is "too much liability" making the
products too expensive as a matter of public policy. The most recent such judgment was
made by Congress in the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92,
119 Stat. 2095 (2005). But the reasons for altering liability rules in the interests of
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The potential for a choice-of-forum clause to make litigation more
expensive might occur to at least some of those who actually saw and read
a choice-of-forum clause promulgated by a business. In this sense, choice-
of-forum clauses seem to act in a somewhat more direct and potentially
transparent way than do choice-of-law clauses. Even this, however, may
be illusory. While it would be difficult to come by empirical proof, it
seems likely that customers who receive choice-of-forum clauses will be
unaware of where they could bring a legal claim against the business absent
the clause, or of whether the business could obtain jurisdiction over them in
a distant place without the choice-of-forum clause.58 Moreover, it's far
more likely that the main features of the contract-the product description,
price, and other features-will attract nearly all of their attention. 9 Of
course, in the unlikely event they read the form, they might well understand
that something is different given this clause, and that, perhaps, the
difference runs in the business' favor. But any full understanding of what a
choice-of-forum clause means in rational choice terms is likely to be absent
from the vast run of people who receive forms. This may have bearing on
the way one views such clauses in contract terms.
Choice-of-forum clauses can have more subtle effects than the
relatively obvious one of transplanting litigation from a home forum to
somewhere else. Those effects are not communicated by the text of a
choice-of-forum clause. The plaintiff in America Online, Inc. v. Booker6°
brought a class action in Florida challenging AOL's practice of charging
customers for the time they spent reading pop-up ads. The service terms
promulgated by AOL contained both choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
clauses specifying a Virginia forum and Virginia law to be applied. What
the plaintiff or other subscribers likely could not have known was that
Virginia had no class action device and, therefore, that AOL sought to
remove, via its choice-of-forum clause, an important procedural device for
vindicating subscribers' rights without even mentioning it.
As has been typical in these cases, the court did not address the
contract question-whether there was agreement-and simply proceeded
protecting given industries from liability require complicated policy (and political) tradeoffs
and economic judgments. Making them on the basis of purported "agreement" by recipients
of forms to the reduced liability regime obscures and probably distorts sound policy
analysis.
58. See Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of
Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 700, 712 (1992).
59. See Braucher, supra note 51, at 63-64.
60. 781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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to the Carnival Cruise Lines part of the analysis: assuming agreement,
should the provision nonetheless be unenforceable because it is
unreasonable or unfair. Note the pivotal rhetorical role that the assumed
agreement plays in the court's justification of its decision:
Here, the forum selection provision was obtained through a freely
negotiated agreement which has not been shown by the plaintiffs to be
either unreasonable or unjust. The unavailability of a class action
procedure in the transferee forum is not sufficient, standing alone, to
render an otherwise valid forum-selection clause unenforceable. Florida
plaintiffs cannot defeat otherwise valid provisions requiring suit in other
states simply by asserting a cause of action in the name of a putative
class.6'
The centrality of free contract ideology in this analysis suggests that
modem contract law itself may offer some promise to adherents in these
settings.
III. GETTING THE CONTRACT INTO THE ANALYSIS: WORKING WITH
CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW AND FORUM
The cases reflect confusion in the bench and bar about the approach
one should take when a choice-of-law or forum clause appears in an
adhesive form.62 Recognizing that the following structure is somewhat
artificial, I advance it in the hope that it can bring clarity to the legal
complexity involved in working with these clauses. With that caveat, I
suggest that the analysis in these cases entails a Three-Step process-a
conflicts analysis, followed by a contracts analysis, followed by a second
conflicts analysis. For both choice-of-law and forum clauses (and for
arbitration clauses as well, with a slight modification) Step 1 assumes that a
jurisdiction will enforce some choice-of-law or forum provisions and asks a
threshold conflicts question: which state's contract law determines whether
the parties in fact have a contract for the specified law or forum. Having
determined in Step 1 which jurisdiction's law controls that contract
question, Step 2 then applies that jurisdiction's contract law, asking
61. Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
62. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Forum Selection in International Contract Litigation: The
Role of Judicial Discretion, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DisP. RES. 185, 196 (2004)
(choice-of-forum); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law:
Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 347
(1988) (choice-of-law).
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whether the promulgated provision is binding as a matter of applicable
contract law. Only when that question is answered affirmatively should
the analysis proceed to Step 3-are there principles, other than contract law
principles, that require that the potentially enforceable agreement found in
Step 2 not be enforced? These steps are probably not independent of one
another-contract law principles might properly inform and influence the
conflicts principles and vice versa-but to understand what is implicated
doctrinally, it is useful to treat them separately.63 A discussion using this
simplified framework will serve as a foundation for understanding the
opportunities that contract law might provide in this context and then for
considering the difficult policy questions that are implicated by widespread
promulgation of these provisions.
Because the structure is simpler, we will begin with choice-of-forum
provisions. Champions of contractual choice-of-law and contractual
choice-of-forum in negotiated contract settings had to confront different
obstacles in their efforts to obtain legal recognition for them. Traces of
these obstacles are reflected in the limitations the law has placed on these
agreements.
A. CHOICE-OF-FORUM PROVISIONS-DOMESTIC LIMITATIONS
The limitations on choice-of-forum agreements have historically
proceeded directly from the jurisdictional power exercised by courts.
Assuming jurisdiction over a given matter, what effect should a private
agreement of the parties to "exclusive jurisdiction" 64 elsewhere have on the
forum's exercise of that jurisdiction? Courts have moved, since the 1972
63. The majority and dissent in Carnival Cruise Lines illustrates this point. The majority
seemed to assume contract formation and approached the case as one that was in the Bremen
line of cases (a predominantly conflict of laws analysis). 499 U.S. at 589. The dissent
carefully looked at whether the parties ought to be bound contractually-the implications of
standard terms, inability to bargain over them, etc. (a predominantly contract law analysis).
Id. Obviously, the majority and dissenting opinions were related. But it is hard to judge
from the opinions whether they were aware they were talking about separate aspects of the
same problem that had different policy determinants. I contend that more clarity (for the
Justices and for readers) in the policy choices would have resulted from a more explicit
awareness that Carnival implicated both contract law policy and jurisdictional policy.
64. The dynamics with non-exclusive choice-of-forum clauses are different because there
is not, in those cases, the direct conflict between the forum's exercise of jurisdiction and the
parties' exercise of their will. Put differently, exercise of jurisdiction by the forum is, in a
non-exclusive case, (obviously) consistent with the parties' intent. While such non-
exclusive clauses can have commercial utility, they are beyond the scope of the discussion
here. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 6, § 11.2 at 478.
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Bremen decision 65 from outright hostility towards this challenge to their
power, to widespread deference to party intent and, no doubt, the
commercial utility of these clauses has played a role in their widespread
recognition. But the proponents never succeeded in completely "ousting
66
the court's pre-existing jurisdiction through their contractual acts of will:
there continue to be limitations articulated by the Court in The Bremen and
later in Carnival Cruise Lines making clear that courts retain ultimate
power to refuse enforcement of such agreements.
What choice-of-forum provisions require, in addition to a contract law
analysis, is consideration of the forum's jurisdictional power and of the
potential conflict between the forum court's power and the private ordering
policies behind contract law. Because choice-of-forum provisions create
conflicts between presumed party intent and the forum's pre-existing
judicial power, it follows that the reconciliation of this conflict is
jurisdiction-specific. Put differently, courts of different jurisdictions can,
in theory, have diverse views about the appropriate balance between party
autonomy and jurisdictional power.
Since it is the forum court's judicial authority that is challenged by the
parties' choice of a different forum, the metes and bounds of party
autonomy vis A vis the forum must be set by the law of the forum. But,
assuming a given court allows some agreements to "oust" it of jurisdiction,
this need not necessarily mean that the contract law governing whether the
parties reached a permissible agreement should be the law of the forum.
67
The analysis developed earlier can help to clarify this.
Consider this simple example involving three jurisdictions, the Forum
(F), the State with the most substantial relationship with the contract (R),
and the Chosen State (C). Suppose the parties make a contract that
contains within it a provision specifying C as the exclusive forum.
Suppose further that among the jurisdictions that are connected to the
contract, R has such a great deal to do with the contract's formation,
65. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 401 U.S. 1 (1972).
66. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1989) ("The parties' agreement
as to the place of the action will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable") is the
provision that states the Bremen rule. No mention is made in the black letter or comments
as to whose contract law the court should apply in determining whether a valid contract for
forum exists. No cases have been found to clarify whose contract law ought to apply to the
purported contract for forum.
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parties, and performance, that we (and the parties) would normally imagine
its law would apply to control the parties' dealings. Finally, suppose that
one party has disregarded the choice-of-C clause and brought suit in F, a
state with just enough contacts that the court can exercise jurisdiction over
the controversy. In the analysis suggested here, the F court would first
consider in Step 1 what state's contract law ought to determine the binding
effect of the choice-of-forum clause. Under these facts, that law could be
the law of R, at least if the likely frame of reference of the parties is an
important factor in the determination.68 Having done that, the F court
would proceed to analyze that provision under R's contract law in Step 2.
If the F court found no binding contract under R's contract law, it would
disregard the clause and exercise its own jurisdiction over the case. If it did
find a binding contract, the court would then proceed to Step 3 to consider
whether F's own policies ought to override the contract it just found in Step
2.
One might object that it is unduly complex (and artificial) to apply the
forum's party autonomy override in Step 3, after finding a contract, rather
than at the outset in Step 1. After all, if the jurisdiction imposes some limit
to party autonomy to choose an exclusive forum, why not simply assume a
contract and face that question at the outset? Unfortunately, courts have
done this all too often and, in the process, have missed important norms
from contract law that could contribute to the analysis. The Three-Step
process, artificial as it might be, provides for a much richer analysis and a
greater awareness of the choices being made.
Moreover, this more complex analysis gives the forum court an
opportunity to consider, when appropriate, the policy judgments of
jurisdictions with a greater stake in the controversy than the forum.
Suppose, for example, that R validated virtually all adhesion contracts with
very few exceptions and that F validated comparatively few of them. At
the threshold Step 1, the court could use R's law or F's law to determine
whether to enforce the choice-of-forum. An emphasis on the likely frame
of reference of the parties would lead to application of R state's law and
recognition in Step 2 of the parties' agreement to the choice-of-forum. The
forum would then consider in Step 3 whether it should be overridden by F
state's policies. If the forum court chose not to enforce the contract for the
C forum, the expanded analysis makes it clear that it would be on account
of F's jurisdictional principles, not F's contract principles.
68. Cf SCOLES ET AL., supra note 6, §§ 18.13, 18.16.
[Vol. 2:1
FINDING THE CONTRACT IN CONTRACTS
Alternatively, the forum could apply forum law in Step 1 on the
grounds that, given the contract at issue, there was no collective frame of
reference of the parties, only the frame of reference of the drafter. If that
were the perception, applying the contract law of R would be less
compelling than before. If the court found forum law applicable in Step 1,
it would refuse to find the choice-of-forum enforceable as a matter of
contract in Step 2 and there would be no need to go to Step 3. The grounds
for denying enforcement would be the absence of agreement rather than the
conclusion that the forum's policies were entitled to more weight than R
state's.
Thus, the more complicated analysis would make clear whether refusal
of enforcement were grounded in problems between the two parties or
problems between the collective will of the parties and the willingness of
the forum court to bend to them. While the court may have intuition that its
refusal to enforce a choice-of-forum provision is grounded in one reason or
the other, we cannot know which it is without a focus on which contract
law is applicable in Step 1.69
It should be obvious that if a choice-of-law clause is included with a
choice-of-forum clause, the analysis gets far more complex, if not
impenetrable. 70  Even courts that do an excellent job of analyzing the
substantive issues may proceed to their decisions without considering the
conflicts policies that deserve attention even if, ultimately, the agreement
will be voided by the conflicts policies of the forum.
The analysis in America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court,71 one of the
few modern cases that does not contain an arbitration clause, shows the
potential complexity of the issues. This was a California class action
brought by AOL customers under, among other things, the California
Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) claiming that AOL continued
debiting their credit cards after they had terminated service. That Act gave
consumers a right to seek class action relief and contained provisions
voiding waivers of its provisions as contrary to California public policy. In
69. The Supreme Court's majority in Carnival Cruise Lines refused to make a division
based on contract type in its analysis. 499 U.S. at 591-93. Once it assumed contractual
obligation, the case became just like The Bremen, despite the very obvious differences in the
two settings. The majority clearly skipped Step 1 and probably skipped Step 2.
70. See generally Mullenix, supra note 62, at 347-49.
71.90 Cal. App. 4th 1 (2001).
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the underlying service terms, AOL had promulgated choice-of-law and
forum provisions designating Virginia as the applicable law and exclusive
forum for disputes. AOL thus sought dismissal of the case pursuant to the
choice-of-forum provision, a potential death blow to the class action.72 In
contrast to the approach in Booker,73 the court in America Online v.
Superior Court refused to enforce the contract provision, reasoning that
enforcement would amount to a waiver prohibited by California policy and
because enforcement would substantially diminish the consumers' rights in
violation of California policy. 74
It should be obvious that, had the court applied Virginia law to the
choice-of-forum problem, the case could have gone the other way: it is
scarcely possible that Virginia law would refuse, on public policy grounds,
to enforce a choice-of-forum clause because the chosen forum (Virginia)
lacked a class action procedure! But Virginia law could have applied to
form a contract for a Virginia forum-AOL was located in Virginia and all
of its customer contracts had that feature in common. But whether Virginia
law was applicable to the choice-of-forum clause (Step 1) or formed a
contract for forum (Step 2), the California legislature, by enacting CLRA to
protect California residents, essentially stated an override that was
applicable in this California forum.
The Conflicts Restatement provision directs enforcement of a choice-
of-forum agreement "unless it is unfair or unreasonable. '75 This Step 3
language directly parallels that of The Bremen where the court concluded
that it was not "unfair, unjust, or unreasonable" 76 to hold a party to the
agreement, despite the substantial inconvenience it might present. The
America Online v. Superior Court opinion is probably best understood as
either a specific articulation of this rule by a California court or as a
legislative addition to it (via the CLRA), as applicable by California courts,
in Step 3. It doesn't matter how the contract formed or under whose law,
72. As noted earlier, Virginia has no procedure for class action relief. See supra text at
note 60.
73. America Online v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). See also supra
text accompanying note 60.
74. America Online v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 4th 1 (2001).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80, quoted supra in note 39.
76. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972). Earlier in the case, the
Court states "[t]he correct approach would have been to enforce the forum clause
specifically unless Zapata could clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and
unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching." Id. at 15.
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the legislature has directed California courts not to yield their jurisdiction
to party autonomy in these situations.
Carnival Cruise Lines, discussed earlier,77 gave meaning to the Conflicts
Restatement's standard for choice-of-forum clauses appearing in cruise
ship tickets within Federal admiralty jurisdiction. The majority decision is
clearly striking a balance between party autonomy and the power of federal
courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction-a Step 3 decision relying on The
Bremen, another Step 3 decision. But does Carnival Cruise Lines say
anything useful about contract law and the policies of freedom to contract
and (in this context, more importantly) freedom from contract underlying
those policies?
7 8
That both majority and dissent were silent on whose contract law they
were interpreting is telling. Was this the contract law of Washington,
California, Florida, or, indeed, was it some form of federal contract law
applicable in Admiralty cases? All would be possible, but this lack of
clarity in the applicable contract law makes it even more plausible that
Carnival Cruise Lines is simply not a contract case at all; contract law was
not at the core of the majority's analysis.79 Rather, Carnival Cruise Lines
is a decision where assumed, abstract, and perhaps idealized, party
autonomy confronts the federal admiralty courts' exercise of their
jurisdiction. Even as to that Step 3 question, its reach as a formal precedent
is limited to federal courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction. But the
analysis here suggests that its broader reach, as stating a plausible view of
contract policy (the Step 2 question), may also be quite limited.
Both Carnival Cruise Lines and America Online v. Superior Court help
to underscore that an important question in a choice-of-forum case-
whether the provision is binding as a matter of contract-is easily missed
within a conflicts analysis. Some commentators have lamented contract
law's displacement of constitutional and jurisdictional principles in this
context. 80 It's no wonder: potentially robust contract law is sandwiched
77. See supra text accompanying note 42.
78. See Speidel, supra note 5, at 1070.
79. Contract law was at the core of Justice Stevens' dissent, but it is unclear there, as
well, which contract law was his focus. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 597
(1991). The dissonance in the two opinions may well have resulted from the fact that the
majority and dissent were talking about two different things. See also supra note 63.
80. See generally Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996
SuP. CT. REv. 331 (1996); Mullenix, supra note 62.
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within complex conflicts analysis where courts and commentators alike
assume there is agreement and proceed from there. The very complexity of
the conflicts-contract-conflicts analysis might lead one to underutilize-
and perhaps underestimate-the state contract law devices that are actually
available.
B. CHOICE-OF-FORUM PROVISIONS - EXPANDING "PARTY AUTONOMY"
AND LIMITING STATE REGULATION IN INTERNATIONAL SETTINGS
The importance of the contract law question, whether a choice-of-
forum clause is binding as a matter of contract, will become considerably
more important if two major lawmaking efforts currently underway evolve
into rules that become binding on courts. Both would strengthen the
importance of choice-of-forum clauses in international settings. In that
sense, they make an understanding of the contract law predicates to such
agreements all the more important. Both aim at the courts' exercise of their
power vis A vis party autonomy (i.e., Step 3); neither explicitly aims to
substantially change the analysis of the preceding (Step 2) contract law
question.81 Both suffer from a degree of opaqueness as to what
jurisdiction's contract law (Step 1) the forum ought to bring to bear in Step
2 on the choice-of-forum clause.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law82 recently
concluded its Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (hereinafter the
Hague Choice of Court Convention) that will require parties to the treaty to
enforce the "choice of court" agreements of one anothers' citizens, and to
enforce the judgments of courts chosen in "choice of court" agreements.
This effort is a remnant of a far more ambitious project that would have
called for mutual enforcement of treaty-state judgments.83
81. The statement in the text may be an oversimplification. If either effort is designed to
change the contract law analysis from state contract law to a federalized version of contract
law (a question that both efforts seem to leave open, see infra text at note 99), then they will
have altered the analysis by unifying it.
82. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements (June 30, 2005), available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?a
ct=conventions.text&cid=98 (last visited November 15, 2005) [hereinafter Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements].
83. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, An Introduction to the Hague Convention, in A GLOBAL
LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 3, 3-13 (John J. Barcelo
III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002) (detailing the Hague provisions); George A.L. Droz,
Preliminary Draft of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters: Provisions of Jurisdiction, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND
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An extended discussion of the Hague Choice of Court Convention is
beyond the scope of this article. But briefly stated, the objective has been
to obtain widespread international enforcement of choice-of-forum
provisions and of the judgments that result from proceedings consistent
with them. There are several aspects of the Hague Choice of Court
Convention of interest here. First, the Convention would exclude contracts
involving a narrowly-defined "consumer,, 84 a subset of contracts far
narrower than "form" or "adhesion" contracts. Second, it requires chosen
courts to exercise jurisdiction and, essentially, forbids unchosen courts
from exercising the jurisdiction they ordinarily would have.85 And third, it
is at present indeterminate on the Step 1 analysis-whose contract law will
decide the question whether the choice of court provision is binding or
not.86 If the United States becomes a party to the Convention, both choice-
JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 15, 15-36 (John J. Barcelo III & Kevin M. Clermont
eds., 2002) (detailing the Hague provisions); Matthew H. Alder, If We Build It, Will They
Come?-The Need for a Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Civil Monetary Judgments, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 79, 107-10 (1994) (describing the
history of the Hague Conference in the early 1990s); Martin Davies, Time to Change the
Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REv. 309, 381-83 (2002) (discussing
the 1999 Draft Hague Convention and its possible ramifications); Arthur T. von Mehren,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague
Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 271-73 (Summer 1994) (describing the
early history of the Hague Choice of Court Convention).
84. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 82, Article 2. The
Convention provides: "1. This Convention shall not apply to exclusive choice of court
agreements - a) to which a natural person acting primarily for personal, family or household
purposes (a consumer) is a party ......
While this definition tracks the substance of the Uniform Commercial Code's definition,
see U.C.C. § 1-201 (11) (2003 Revision), it is narrower than that of other countries that are
would-be parties to the Convention. See, e.g., 80/934/EEC: Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, art. 5, § 1, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1, 2-3 (defining a
consumer contract as "a contract the object of which is the supply of goods or services to a
person... for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession, or a
contract for the provision of credit for that object"). The definition is also certainly not
coextensive with the range of adhesion contracts. A dentist buying software for her practice
is functionally no different from a "consumer" when it comes to being bound by a click-to-
agree choice-of-forum clause contained within license terms that may or may not be
available in advance. See generally Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-
Market Concept and Its Lessons for Policing Standard Form Contracts, 7 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 393 (2003).
85. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 82, Articles 5 & 6.
86. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Special Commission on Jurisdiction,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
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of-forum clauses and, obviously, the contract law governing their
enforceability will become more important than they are presently. The
Convention would require state courts to limit their jurisdiction in Step 3 in
ways they might otherwise not be inclined to do.
The second effort was recently concluded by a drafting committee of
the American Law Institute whose project, Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute was ratified
by the membership during its May 2005 meeting.87 This Project is aimed at
unifying, in the interests of international trade, what is now a somewhat
diverse state law approach to enforcement of foreign judgments.88 If
enacted, the proposed federal statute would preempt the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgment Recognition Act, enacted in some 30 states. 89 Section
5(b)(i) provides, in part:
[A] foreign judgment shall not be recognized or enforced in a court in the
United States if the party resisting recognition or enforcement establishes
that the judgment resulted from a proceeding undertaken contrary to an
agreement under which the dispute was to be determined exclusively in
another forum. 90
Whereas the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
provides that a court "need not" enforce a judgment entered in violation of
a choice-of-forum provision,91 the ALl Project's draft makes denial of
enforcement of the judgment virtually mandatory. Moreover, unlike the
Hague Choice of Court Convention, the Project's draft does not exclude
"consumers" or adhesion contracts from its scope.92
Work. Doc. No. 110 Revised (April 21-27, 2004), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload
/wop/ jdgm_wdl 10 e.pdf., Article 7, nn. 3-4 (the penultimate draft of the Convention).
Compare Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 82, Article 6.
87. The American Law Institute Annual Meeting, May 16-18, 2005, at http://www.ali.org
(follow "Annual Meeting" hyperlink; then follow "Actions Taken on 2005 Annual Meeting
Drafts" hyperlink).
88. ALl International Judgment Recognition Project, supra note 4.
89. See Id. at § 2 cmt. a.
90. ALI International Judgment Recognition Project, supra note 4, § 5(b)(i) (emphasis
added). Section 5(b)(ii) provides complex exceptions for the case where the proponent of
the choice-of-forum provision did not raise it in the "wrong" court and for the case where
that proponent raised it but lost in the "wrong" court. In the latter case, the forum court's
determination that the choice of (a different) forum provision was not binding is entitled to
deference by the enforcing court in the United States unless 1) that determination was
"manifestly unreasonable" or 2) the original court rejects all choice-of-forum agreements.
Id. § 5(b)(ii) and cmt. f.
91. UNIF. FoREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(5), 13 U.L.A. 43 (2002).
92. In this respect, it is the same as the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition
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Comment f to the Project's section 5(b) begs the Step 1 question of
what contract law the foreign forum court would apply in Step 2 to a
choice-of-forum clause.93 Once decided (on whatever basis), that foreign
court's decision is entitled to substantial deference by the enforcing court in
the United States. The proposed statute states federal policy on the contest
between party autonomy and state jurisdiction and would thus change and
unify the rules states now use in a version of Step 3.94 The dynamics
apparently change if the foreign judgment is rendered by default.
To illustrate how the Project's provision seems to work, suppose an
American business were sued by a customer in a French court on a contract
that included a choice-of-forum provision designating a United States
forum. Suppose further that the business sought dismissal based on the
choice-of-forum clause but the French court refused to enforce the
provision and later entered judgment against the American business. The
Draft's assumption seems to be that the French court will apply its own
contract law to the problem; the Draft Project suggests that deference
would be due to the French court's ruling95 on the choice-of-forum clause
and the French judgment would be enforceable in the United States.
Now suppose, instead, the same case where the American business
were properly within the jurisdiction of the French court and served with
process, but refused to appear (on the basis of the choice-of-forum clause)
and thereby permitted a default judgment to be entered against it. Suppose
further that the default judgment eventually required enforcement in the
Act, which does not provide for such exceptions either. On the other hand, the Uniform Act
was promulgated long before Carnival Cruise Lines made clear that choice-of-forum
clauses in adhesion contracts might be enforceable.
93. ALl International Judgment Recognition Project, supra note 4, § 5 cmt. f, states in
part: "If the issue of validity of the forum-selection agreement was raised in the rendering
court and that court has held it to be inapplicable or invalid after contest, that determination
is not ordinarily open to challenge in a court in the United States ......
94. Since this Project aims to unify the diverse state law governing the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, its mandate would operate not on deferring to party
autonomy in choice-of-forum matters, but on deferring to it when that autonomy has
matured into a foreign judgment. But, as with the choice-of-law and forum provisions that
are the focus of this Article, the prerequisite to applicability of the Project's provision is a
choice-of-forum agreement. As always, it is necessary to determine what law governs that
contract question (Step 1) and what that law provides under the given facts (Step 2).
95. As likely as not, this deference is in the interests of furthering a policy of finality of
judgments. It apparently makes no difference what jurisdiction's contract law the French
court applies to the problem in Step 2.
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United States. Now, presumably the enforcing court would be required to
determine as an original matter96 whether the choice-of-forum clause was
binding.
Which contract law would determine this question in the enforcing
court? No answer emerges from either the Draft's black letter or
comments, 97 and the Draft may assume that the forum court would apply its
own contract law to the question if it were to decide the case. In both the
forum and enforcing settings, the Draft thus reflects inadequate attention to
the preceding Step 1 conflict of laws question.
Once there is a focus on Step 1, several possibilities emerge: the
enforcing state court could apply its own contract law, it could use some
form of federal contract law, or it could engage in a more nuanced conflicts
analysis that would consider the interests of France and the enforcing state
in the contract issues.
The worst choice would probably be to apply the enforcing state's own
contract law. A primary reason for the ALI Project is uniformity in
enforcement of judgments, but our contract law, particularly in adhesive
settings, varies among states. Allowing this state-to-state diversity to work
its way into the enforcement mechanism would undercut the Project's goal
of uniformity because the foreigner's success in enforcing the default
judgment would now depend on the diverse contract law of the state where
enforcement was sought. The federal common law approach would be at
odds with our history of leaving contract law to the states but would, at
least in theory, supply uniformity across the decisions on the question of
whether the contractual choice-of-law provision was enforceable (and
therefore the default judgment not enforceable).
The problem with both of these approaches is that they would generate
perverse forum shopping incentives. American contract law-whether
state or federal-is typically less protective of consumers than is European
law. This means that the business will have good reason to sit out the
96. The informed French plaintiff might want to obtain a specific finding by the French
court that the choice-of-forum provision was not binding as a matter of French law.
Although the question whether such a finding would later be recognized is an open question
under the Project's draft, such a finding would surely complicate matters in the enforcing
court.
97. Comment f states in part: "If the judgment debtor failed to appear in the rendering
court, the issue of validity of the forum-selection agreement will be contested only in the
court in the United States." ALl International Judgment Recognition Project, supra note 4,
§ 5 cmt. f.
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French litigation and hope for a favorable decision once the judgment
comes here for enforcement. Moreover, from the conflict of laws
perspective, both approaches might not supply appropriate deference to the
law of the state or country having the best claim to govern the transaction
with its law.
This leaves a third approach-a Step 1 conflict of laws approach-
which, from a policy perspective, might be the best. At least in theory, if
all jurisdictions agreed in Step 1 that the governing law should be that with
the most substantial relationship with the transaction,98 then the same law
would apply in all courts in the United States and in French courts, the
Project's goals of uniformity in enforcement would be met, and the
incentives for forum shopping would be reduced.99 The problem we face
with this solution is an old pervasive one: conflict of laws is state law and,
as such, it varies from state-to-state. This means that the Step 1 rules might
not, even in theory, point at the same applicable contract law and that,
therefore, inconsistency in enforcement is again a problem. This problem
could be solved with a federal conflict of laws rule, applicable in state
courts in Step 1. Then, in theory, all domestic courts would apply the same
rule in Step 1 which, in theory, would point to the same contract law for
application in Step 2. Commentators have recognized in other contexts that
a federal conflicts rule applicable in state courts might be sound policy.'00
The Project offers yet another opportunity to consider it.
Had the Project considered the contract law questions implicated in
Step 2, it might have considered the conflicts questions that naturally
precede those contract questions in Step 1. It could have specified the
application of some version of federal contract law in this situation, or it
could have stated a uniform conflict of laws rule for the states to follow in
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
99. These incentives probably cannot be eliminated in this context. Even under this third
system, one can imagine an American business balancing likely defeat in France against a
shot that the American court will misconstrue French law and find in its favor at the
enforcement stage. The strategic incentives that these examples suggest mean that foreign
governments suspicious or hostile to choice-of-forum clauses in mass market contracts will
have to take more direct regulatory action against American businesses doing business with
their citizens. Without such regulation, we could expect many American businesses doing
business abroad to include choice of (American) forum clauses in their mass market
contracts, to keep their assets out of the customer's country, and to avoid participating in
legal actions brought by the foreign customers.
100. See Laycock, supra note 14.
Winter 2005]
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
pursuing the more nuanced Step 1 conflicts analysis. Unless the ALI draft
is revised or commentary added to it before it goes to Congress, we will
have to await judicial decisions that, hopefully, will make clear the contract
law that they are applying in Step 2 and the (Step 1) reasons that law
should be applied.
C. THE SPECIAL CASE OF ARBITRATION
Arbitration clauses present a special kind of choice-of-forum clause
and, at first blush, one might expect them to be governed by similar
principles. Early on, they were. Like contract provisions calling for a
different forum, arbitration clauses were seen by forum courts as attempts
to "oust" the court of jurisdiction.101 As such, the question was one of
resolving the conflict between the forum's power and the private parties'
power to "oust" it, the traditional conflicts inquiry in which collective party
autonomy confronts the jurisdiction's power.10 2
The Federal Arbitration Act, enacted in 1925, changed all that. Section
2 provides:
A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.
03
This converts what was an analysis focused on the conflict between the
private ordering (reflected in the choice-of-forum clause) and the court's
own jurisdictional power, into a simpler analysis that has removed the
forum court's inherent power from the analysis. It should be evident that
the FAA addressed-and may have simply eliminated-the Step 3
101. See, e.g., Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1868) (finding
that an agreement to arbitrate "is held invalid, because it is an attempt to oust the courts of
jurisdiction by excluding the assured from all resort to them for his remedy."); Reed v.
Wash. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 138 Mass. 572, 575 (1885) (noting that an agreement to
arbitrate will not be enforced because it "would oust the courts of their jurisdiction"); Mach.
Prods. Co. v. Prairie Local Lodge No. 1538 of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 94 So. 2d 344, 348
(Miss. 1957) (holding a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate voidable by either party because
"private persons cannot... oust the jurisdiction of the legally constituted courts"); Riley v.
Jarvis, 26 S.E. 366, 367-68 (W. Va. 1896) (noting that "parties could not, by agreement,
oust the courts of the jurisdiction assigned them by law.").
102. See cited cases, supra notes 101 & 39.
103. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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analysis. But notwithstanding the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration,104 enforced even in settings involving important public policy
issues,105 the threshold question, whether the challenging party is bound as
a matter of state contract law, survives. 10 6  This implicates the Step 1
question: which state's contract law? The cases reflect confusion about
that question, particularly when the inquiry is complicated by a choice-of-
law clause within the same set of terms.
D. CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISIONS
Choice-of-law clauses bring with them far more potential for confusion
than do choice-of-forum provisions. They may, of course, be binding
terms of a contractual relationship arising under some jurisdiction's
contract law. But layered on top of the Step 2 contract analysis, there are
complex, potentially restrictive conflict of laws principles. Perhaps this
complexity accounts for the fact that parties and courts usually fail to focus
on the Step 2 contract law question (and, inevitably, on the Step 1 which-
contract-law question) and, almost invariably, assume that the choice-of-
law clause is binding as a matter of contract law. Courts, and apparently
104. The cases are legion reiterating a strong federal policy favoring arbitration in
situations where a claimant is attempting to avoid a contractual arbitration clause in a
judicial forum. For representational samplings, see Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or
Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 638 (1996); Speidel, supra note 5, at 1071.
105. Many have thought that these issues were inappropriate for an arbitrator's decision
but the current law is clearly to the contrary. Perhaps the most important such case-and
one that laid the foundation for the many that followed-was Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), where the Supreme Court required an
American company's federal antitrust claim against a Japanese company to be heard by
Japanese arbitrators. Mitsubishi involved an arbitration clause that was part of a negotiated
contract. Such issues in the adhesion contract arena include claims of age discrimination in
employment, see, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); truth in
lending, see, e.g., Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2002);
and claims of employment discrimination in the brokerage industry, see, e.g., Cremin v.
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1470 (N.D. I11. 1997).
106. Badie v. Bank of America, 67 Cal. App. 4th 779 (1998), illustrates the contract
analysis, uncomplicated either by a choice of law clause or the possibility of a different
State's law applying to the contract. The question was whether an obligation to proceed
with arbitration arose from the bank's forms. Finding that the arbitration clause was
delivered by a "bill stuffer" after the accounts arose and were not properly parts of the
underlying relationship, the court rejected the proposition that there was a contractual
agreement to arbitrate. Compare Edelist v. MBNA, 790 A.2d 1294 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001),
discussed infra beginning at note 116.
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parties, take this leap of faith in virtually all circumstances, including
adhesion contracts involving consumers and small businesses where the
dynamics of the situation and the contract law that applies to it might be
very different.
Beyond that, the choice-of-law cases also reflect missed opportunities
and lack of understanding at the third stage of analysis, the stage where one
would consider whether a choice-of-law provision, already found binding
under applicable contract law, may nonetheless be unenforceable because
of conflict of laws principles that limit such contractual terms.
We may be at this underdeveloped and confused stage because of the
peculiar way the law governing choice-of-law clauses developed. As
indicated above, choice-of-law clauses were largely unenforceable before
the 1950s and the limitations on those provisions came not from contract
law but from conflict of laws jurisprudence. The recognition that such
clauses served valuable commercial needs eventually produced a relaxation
of restrictions, but how those restrictions would be relaxed and what
limitations would remain continued to be conflict of laws questions.
Although the 1952 U.C.C. provision permitting the parties to choose the
applicable law was not very complex, 10 7 the analogous Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws provision'0 8 was loaded with interesting
issues. Thus, the pressure to recognize such clauses was coming from
commercial interests, but the thinking that was triggered by this newly-
recognized commercial need was occurring in the conflicts field.
Moreover, the early paradigm cases which made "news" on contractual
choice-of-law issues were large, negotiated cases where there would be
little doubt that an agreement, enforceable under applicable contract law,
had been made.'0 9 Thus, there was little new material for contracts scholars
to think about-the developments might well have been perceived and
conceived of as purely conflicts developments. 10
107. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1952) (pre-2003 revision).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, quoted supra in note 26.
109. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) ("The choice of that
forum was made in an arm's-length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated
businessmen, and absent some compelling and countervailing reason it should be honored
by the parties and enforced by the courts."); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d
1066, 1069 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (citing The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12); Commerce Consultants
Int'l, Inc. v. Vetrerie Riunite, S.p.A., 867 F.2d 697, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing The
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12).
110. One very early work in this area is Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the
Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1072 (1953), published just ten years after Frederick
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The focus on these clauses in litigated consumer cases is a very recent
phenomenon and it may well be that the habit of not asking contract
questions about choice-of-law clauses generated a kind of inertia when
those clauses began appearing in litigated adhesion contract cases.
Tellingly, a caveat in a comment to the relevant Conflicts Restatement
provision suggests that choice-of-law provisions in adhesion contracts
might be treated differently from those in negotiated contracts1 ' but that
opening seems to have fallen on deaf ears.
E. THE CONFLICT OF LAWS PRINCIPLES THAT LIMIT THE OTHERWISE-
ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT-FOR-LAW
The conflict of laws principles, contained in the Conflicts
Restatement" 12  are extraordinarily cumbersome and nuanced, but
reasonably well-known. The methodology under the Restatement
provision is succinctly expressed by the California court in Nediloyd Lines
B. V. v. Superior Court:
11 3
Briefly restated, the proper approach under Restatement section 187,
subdivision (2) is for the court first to determine either: (1) whether the
chosen state has a substantial relationship to the parties or their
transaction, or (2) whether there is any other reasonable basis for the
parties' choice of law. If neither of these tests is met, that is the end of
the inquiry, and the court need not enforce the parties' choice of law. If,
however, either test is met, the court must next determine whether the
chosen state's law is contrary to a fundamental policy of California. If
Kessler did his pioneering work on the adhesion contract. Frederick Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).
Professor Ehrenzweig expressed considerable skepticism about the propriety of enforcing
choice of law clauses in adhesion contracts.
111. Comment b to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 187 states, in part:
A factor which the forum may consider is whether the choice-of-law provision is
contained in an "adhesion" contract, namely one that is drafted unilaterally by the dominant
party and then presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis to the weaker party who has no real
opportunity to bargain about its terms. Such contracts are usually prepared in printed form,
and frequently at least some of their provisions are in extremely small print. Common
examples are tickets of various kinds and insurance policies. Choice-of-law provisions
contained in such contracts are usually respected. Nevertheless, the forum will scrutinize
such contracts with care and will refuse to apply any choice-of-law provision they may
contain if to do so would result in substantial injustice to the adherent.
112. Section 187 of the Conflicts Restatement is quoted supra in note 26.
113. 3 Cal. 4th 459 (1992).
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there is no such conflict, the court shall enforce the parties' choice of law.
If, however, there is a fundamental conflict with California law, the court
must then determine whether California has a 'materially greater interest
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue .... '
(Rest., § 187, subd. (2).) If California has a materially greater interest
than the chosen state, the choice of law shall not be enforced, for the
obvious reason that in such circumstance we will decline to enforce a law
contrary to this state's fundamental policy."
l 4
As the provision, and the court's explanation make clear, the
restrictions expressed in the Restatement operate only at Step 3, after the
court has determined that the state is a "chosen state" and that the clause
represents the "parties' choice of law." Those conclusions are predicated
on the contract analysis that is not articulated and is probably not present in
the cases. Moreover, when a court faces the contract law question whether
to enforce a choice-of-law clause either in a negotiated contract or in a
promulgated business form, it must first decide whose contract law to apply
to the problem. A court has to start somewhere and, if the question at hand
is whether a party agreed to be bound by chosen law, that chosen law itself
cannot be brought to bear on the question1 5 unless, of course, it would
apply absent the contract choice-of-law clause at issue.
Edelist v. MBNA America Bank" 16 illustrates the approach many courts
take, one that reflects confusion over Steps 1 and 2 and rests largely on the
conflict of laws restrictions. Edelist was a class action brought by a
California resident in Delaware seeking damages for breach of the
underlying contract. The bank's form contained each of the big three
clauses that make their way into credit card cases: 117 an arbitration clause, a
class action waiver, and a choice of Delaware as the exclusive forum" 18 and
114. Id. at 466 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
115. Scoles, et al., refer to this possibility as raising serious "bootstrapping" problems.
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 6, § 18.2 at 956.
116. 790 A.2d 1249 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001).
117. See, e.g., Mackey v. MBNA Am. Bank, 343 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968-69 (W.D. Wash.
2004) (no express class action waiver in arbitration clause); Lloyd v. MBNA Am. Bank, No.
Civ. A. 00-109-SLR, 2001 WL 194300, at *1-2 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2001) (opinion does not
contain the entire credit card agreement-only arbitration clause and class action waiver
included); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005) (no express Delaware
choice-of-forum clause).
118. Edelist, 790 A.2d at 1252-53. The choice of Delaware as a litigation forum was,
apparently, superseded by the arbitration clause and class action waiver. While it is unclear
from the opinion why the plaintiff brought the case in Delaware, the plaintiffs theory was
that the bill stuffer was ineffective to amend the agreement. If that were true, then the
choice of the Delaware forum clause would remain. Whatever the reason, bringing the case
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this legal package was delivered via "bill stuffer"' 1 9 to the plaintiff.120 The
form also specified Delaware law as the governing body of law and
Delaware had precedent suggesting that neither arbitration clauses nor class
action waivers in adhesion contracts with consumers were
unconscionable. 121
The court began with the Conflicts Restatement's Section 188, a
provision that a forum might begin with in the absence of a choice-of-law
by the parties. Briefly stated, that provision "points" to the law of the state
with the most significant relationship to the transaction and parties.
122
After looking at the respective relationships between California and the
plaintiff on one hand and Delaware and the Bank on the other, the court
cited two Delaware cases for the proposition that "Delaware courts will
honor specific choice of law provisions so long as there is some material
linkage between the chosen jurisdiction and the transaction.'' 23 With that
the court concluded that, by the parties' agreement, Delaware law
controlled the dispute.
The articulated Delaware rule that Restatement Section 188 pointed to
was the substance of the Restatement's Section 187(2) (that the parties
could choose law that was "related"). Under that provision, there is no
doubt that the Edelist parties could have contracted for the law either of
California or of Delaware and a court, following that provision, would have
enforced the agreement in Step 3. But this begs the questions, 1) did they
so agree and 2) under what State's contract law did they do so?
Presumably, it was Delaware contract law because the conflicts principle in
Section 188 would have pointed to that law if, as the court may have
silently concluded, Delaware had the most significant contacts with the
parties and transaction. While there was no explicit focus on the
restrictions Delaware contract law might have erected to a binding choice-
in Delaware was, it turned out, fatal to the claim both on the merits and from a conflict of
laws perspective. As the text will develop, the case illustrates the centrality of choice-of-
forum in a conflict of laws analysis and, in this context, to success in an unconscionability
challenge.
119. This term makes its appearance in the earlier California case, Badie v. Bank of
America, 67 Cal. App. 4th 779, 783 (1998).
120. Edelist, 790 A.2d at 1254.
121. Once the court concluded its conflict of laws analysis, it applied these precedents to
find against the plaintiff. Id. at 1260-61.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1) (1971).
123. Edelist, 790 A.2d at 1256.
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of-law agreement in this context, had the court engaged in such an analysis,
we could imagine the court finding few obstacles under Delaware law in
this banking context.
24
While this part of the opinion suffers from murkiness, the court reached
its result perhaps in a more complicated way than contemplated under the
Conflicts Restatement. Section 187, the provision addressing contractual
choice-of-law questions, contemplates that the forum court will apply the
forum's contract law to resolve the threshold question, whether the
agreement to the choice-of-law is enforceable. 25 In Edelist, because the
forum was Delaware, its law was the appropriate contract law to begin the
inquiry under the Restatement provision.
The Restatement's position on whose contract law to begin with-
forum law-is at odds with the more complicated analysis imagined in
Edelist. The Restatement's approach may be predicated on a view that in
contested contract formation settings, there is no collective legal frame of
reference for "the contract" (a "substantial relationship" state), since one
side maintains there is no contract.126 In these circumstances, forum law
may have as good a claim to govern the situation as would the law to which
Section 188 might point. Moreover, the Restatement's approach is far
simpler and more determinate than is that which the Edelist court might
have been using, and simplicity and predictability may be good reasons to
embrace it. 127 But the tradeoff is that, partly because it is so determinate,
this approach offers forum shopping opportunities that the conflict of laws
system is designed to minimize. One could imagine courts in some states
developing a contract law analysis that is more sensitive than that of other
states to the implications of choice-of-law clauses in adhesion contracts. If
the litigation lands in those states, its courts might refuse to enforce choice-
of-law clauses, at least in some instances of perceived customer injustice.
We have just that possibility crystallized-but not resolved-in an
important recent California Supreme Court case. It can serve to illustrate
124. For example, Delaware makes "bill stuffers" binding as a matter of Delaware
contract law by legislation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 952(a) (2005) which provides:
"Any notice of an amendment sent by the bank may be included in the same envelope with a
periodic statement or as part of the periodic statement or in other materials sent to the
borrower." But see Badie v. Bank of America, 67 Cal. App. 4th 779 (1998).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b (1989) (noting issues of
impropriety or mistake "will be determined by the forum in accordance with its own legal
principles"). The provision is quoted in full supra note 28.
126. Cf SCOLES ET AL., supra note 6, § 18.39.
127. Contra Id. § 18.2, at 955.
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how the contracts and conflicts principles might work together in a very
difficult setting.
F. SOME OF THE CONFLICTS (AND CONTRACTS?) IDEAS AT WORK
Discover Bank v. Superior Court128 was a class action brought by
consumers in California against the bank arising out of a bank practice
alleged to be deceptive 29 under the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act. 30 The
bank sought arbitration pursuant to the mandatory arbitration provision in
its forms, and these forms, as usual, included a class action waiver, and a
clause specifying Delaware law as the controlling law for the relationship.
In the appeal to the California Supreme Court, the customers challenged
the class action waiver as unconscionable under California law'3' and
sought class-wide arbitration of their claims. While much of the opinion
was addressed to the court's conclusion that California law on the question
before it was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act,' 32 the Court
eventually concluded that California law rendered the class action waiver
unenforceable in this context and that class-wide arbitration would be
ordered. But all of this was contingent on an assumption: that the
Delaware choice-of-law provisions did not displace the court's use of
California law in this context. It remanded that pivotal question-the
effect of the choice-of-law clause-to the trial court.
13 3
A bird's-eye view of Discover Bank shows an intractable issue of
federalism which will not likely be fully resolved on remand. One side of
the issue is made possible by the widespread enforcement of choice-of-law
provisions in consumer contracts: can a state's businesses, through choice-
of-law clauses in their businesses' forms, project their (that is, their chosen
state's) view of consumer protection into the other forty-nine states.
Upholding the Delaware choice-of-law provision and Delaware's
concomitant validation of class action waivers would effect such a result in
128. 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005).
129. The alleged practice was a representation by the bank that late fees would not be
assessed if payment were received by a certain date but charging late fees if the payment
was received after 1:00 p.m. on that specified date. Id. at 152.
130. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2511-2527 (1999); Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 154.
131. While the plaintiffs maintained that the class action waiver was invalid under
California law, they were careful to maintain their reliance on Delaware law for their
challenge to the substance of the bank's practice. Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 160 n.2.
132. Id. at 161-73.
133. Id. at 173-75.
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California. The flip-side of that question is focused by the unusual way
Discover Bank was framed by the plaintiffs-Delaware law for regulating
the Bank's conduct, California law for regulating the class action waiver:
can California customers, via California law, potentially applicable in the
first instance to (or operable in spite of) these same contractual choice-of-
law provisions, project their (California's) view of consumer protection
from class action waivers into other states via a nationwide class action?
The class action side of this problem has a very short half-life:
California's ability to project its class action policy is coextensive with
consumers' ability to maintain nationwide state class actions. In view of
recent federal legislation, consumers' ability to maintain such class actions
has probably come to an end. 1
34
Choice-of-law clauses in adhesion contracts are, on the other hand, not
likely to disappear soon and we can expect businesses ever more
aggressively to argue that such provisions displace the state law of
"unchosen" states that ordinarily would protect consumers. Moreover, in
the current environment of widespread consumer arbitration, the effects of
inadequately addressed choice-of-law clauses could be multiplied:
arbitrators will "follow" the law, not "develop" it as common law courts
have for centuries. This makes it essential to get the reported judicial cases
"right": if judicial precedent on these issues will, effectively, be "frozen,"
the precedential cases ought to be soundly reasoned and take account of all
the issues triggered by choice-of-law clauses in business forms.
The concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Baxter 135 in Discover
Bank underscores the importance of the contract law underpinning that, at
least in the first instance, lies behind the federalism question. Justice
Baxter apparently thought that Delaware law controlled, primarily because
of the choice-of-law clause, and that, therefore, the case was an
inappropriate vehicle for articulating California law on class action
waivers. 136 Some of his rhetoric imagines a bargain in these adhesion
contracts that, in the context of choice-of-law clauses in particular, is nearly
breathtaking:
134. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005)
(codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1453, 1711-1715). Discover Bank was not affected because the
new law operates only prospectively. Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 9, 119 Stat. 4, 14.
135. Justice Baxter agreed with the majority that the Federal Arbitration Act did not
preempt California law in this case, if it applied, which he believed it did not. Discover
Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 174.
136. Id.
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Here, the parties gave extensive and detailed contractual consideration to
the "issues that would arise . . . if litigation [became] necessary." They
specifically agreed that disputes would be resolved, upon either party's
election, by mandatory arbitration, and that class treatment of the dispute
would not be permitted. Further, they expressly provided that their
agreement would be governed by the law of Delaware-a jurisdiction
which, for policy reasons of its own, allows contractual provisions
requiring nonclass arbitration .... The reasonable expectations of both
Discover Bank and the State of Delaware [sic] would thus be "unfairly
disappointed" if a California rule banning class waivers were applied
despite the parties' agreement.
137
Surely, one could take some comfort with the applicability of Delaware
law to the consumer protection problems if one thought that there were a
full, knowing waiver of the California consumer protection law as the
dissent seems to imply. But the possibility of such a knowing waiver, even
through a far more robust provision than the terse sentence in the bank's
bill-stuffer form, seems extremely far-fetched. Moreover, the dissent's
idealized freedom-of-contract rhetoric should underscore that the opening
questions on remand in Discover Bank are contract law questions and, to
reach them, the court first has to decide which state's law should control
them.
As superb as they are in focusing the larger issues, the Discover Bank's
majority and dissenting opinions both reach beyond these threshold
questions to the conflicts questions such as whether, given agreement to the
choice-of-law clause, enforcement might violate California's fundamental
policy. 138 A richer, more informed analysis entails a consideration of the
threshold questions that precede the conflicts analysis, whether the parties
agreed, as a matter of contract, to the choice-of-law provision and the
necessarily preceding conflicts question, under what jurisdiction's law
should the contract question be resolved.
As to that threshold conflict of laws question, the Restatement calls for
the forum to apply its own contract law to the contract question,1 39 and
California has embraced the Restatement provision as a general matter.1
40
137. Id. at 183-84. The supposedly contractual relationship was between Discover Bank
and the cardholders, not between the Bank and Delaware. That relationship was not at the
core of this dispute between the bank and its customers.
138. Id. at 173 (majority), 180 (dissent).
139. See supra text at notes 125.
140. See Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 459 (1992). See also supra
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Edelist and cases like it may call for the contract law to which the forum's
conflict of laws principles point. Once the applicable contract law is found,
the court will proceed to Step 2 and determine if the contract provision is
binding under that law. Here, contract formation (e.g., are provisions
promulgated via bill stuffers binding), unconscionability (e.g., is a choice-
of-law in a business form that reduces otherwise-applicable consumer
protection, at least without spelling out that fact, unconscionable), and the
other rich tools of contract law can be fully deployed. If (and only if) the
choice-of-law is enforceable under the appropriate state's contract law
should the court reach the Step 3 conflict of laws question, whether
California public policy should nonetheless override the agreement.
As recognized by both majority and dissent,14 1 Discover Bank may
trigger an alternate analysis, one that could prove useful to the plaintiffs in
the case. Matters of procedure have always been the domain of the forum
and subject to forum law. 142 Indeed, it is hard to imagine a reason not to
apply the forum's law to a question of procedure since it directly implicates
the power of the forum court to process disputes in the way its system has
been designed.143 If the Discover Bank matter is perceived as procedural-
can an out-of-state bank's promulgated form limit the range of civil
procedure a forum can engage in-then California will apply its own law to
the question. 144  This could well be the right way to understand the
problem: a number of courts that have sustained class action waivers over
unconscionability attacks have done so by maintaining that class actions
are "mere" procedural devices, not matters of substance, and therefore
text accompanying note 113.
141. Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 173 (majority), 180 (dissent).
142. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.8, at 128 (stating that courts will rely on forum
law to deal with "procedural" aspects of litigation); Mullenix, supra note 62, at 296 (stating
that contractual choice-of-forum is effectively a choice of procedures by the parties);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971) (providing that "[a] court
usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall be conducted even
when it applies the local law rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case").
143. See Mullenix, supra note 62, at 296-97 (advocating for a more procedural based
analysis when analyzing forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses as opposed to the
current method based on contract law).
144. As articulated in the text, this would primarily be a conflicts question, do the parties
collectively have the power through their contract to alter the preexisting civil procedure
rules of the forum? In the analysis developed in this Article, this question would come at
Step 3 as an override to a valid contract found through Steps 1 and 2 under applicable
contract law. Much of the majority's analysis in Discover Bank would, by contrast, be
better characterized as animated by contract law: does one party, through its business form,
have the power to bind the other to a class action waiver.
[Vol. 2:1
FINDING THE CONTRACT IN CONTRACTS
provisions waiving them are not of such moment to trigger an
unconscionability conclusion.
145
IV. CONCLUSIONS-THE FUTURE OF CONTRACTS FOR LAW, FORUM,
AND ARBITRATION
For negotiated contracts, the future of contracts for law, forum, and
arbitration is bright. The provisions make contract litigation more
predictable and thereby add value to the underlying transactions. In
international contracts particularly, such provisions are probably essential
to a competently drafted contract. At this point in our economic
development, such provisions are largely uncontroversial.
When these provisions appear on business forms distributed to
customers, however, it is another story. Once again, Discover Bank is a
good illustration in the context of choice-of-law. If one takes much of the
Discover Bank dissent at face value, the bank's simple insertion of a choice
of (Delaware) law clause in the customers' forms did (or ought to)
transform what would have been an inquiry into unconscionability under
California law into one under Delaware law where, as the dissent pointed
out, class action waivers have been sustained. What is impermissible under
California law becomes permissible if the bank simply adds a choice of
Delaware law sentence to the form.
While the underlying issues and doctrine may be complex and elusive,
most bystanders would probably consider this to be drafting slight-of-hand
or even legal chicanery. We begin with a provision that is probably
unenforceable in the customer's home state (say a class action waiver), and
the home state's law says or implies that a waiver of the home state's
protection is unenforceable. Direct waiver by form contract of the class
action remedy being unavailable, the business instead finds and chooses a
state's law that sees things the other way and promulgates that law through
the form. Abracadabra! Without even mentioning the word "waiver" or
"class action," the business has converted a losing case into a winner, an
145. See, e.g., Lloyd v. MBNA Am. Bank, 27 F. App'x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding
that an arbitration agreement barring classwide relief is not unconscionable because class
actions are "merely" a procedural right); Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369
(3d Cir. 2000) (holding that an arbitration clause that may render class actions unavailable is
enforceable because class actions are "merely" a procedural right); Strand v. U.S. Bank
Nat'l Ass'n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 926-27 (N.D. 2005) (finding that a "no class action"
provision is not unconscionable because class actions are "purely" a procedural right).
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almost-amazing result that probably does neither the law nor the reputation
of lawyers any good. As long as contract law remains a system where
obligation is imposed on the basis of assent,146 such a result should raise
some questions.
But the cases suggest that the questions are going unasked. As is
evident from the cases, either the claimant concedes the application of the
specified law, 147 or, as in Schefiley, 148 the court concludes there was
agreement, as a matter of contract, to the other state's law without any
discussion. The legal tangle within which these contract provisions exist
may well account for their summary treatment in the cases.
The dominant conflict of laws analysis has, similarly, tended to obscure
the contract issues embedded in choice of forum clauses in business forms.
Although such court-choosing provisions are important in both the ALI's
and the Hague's efforts at international enforcement of judgments and
related issues, both drafts paid very little attention to the contract issues
implicated by their work. Once again, there are few controversial issues
with negotiated contracts and both drafting bodies probably had negotiated
contracts in mind when they developed their drafts. This is understandable
in one sense; despite an occasional call to the contrary, 149 the law continues
to lump adhesive business forms in with negotiated contracts and has, so
far, failed to adequately differentiate the two on the basis of assent.
50
When business forms are choosing the law and forum, and recipients
cannot understand the provisions (even if they took the time to find and
read them), one would hope that contract law might have something to
offer on whether these are true commitments worth enforcing. At the
minimum, we might learn what it is about these contract provisions that
justifies their enforcement without any semblance of true assent of the
recipients, or how the widespread enforcement of these provisions affects
the theoretical grounding of contract law in party assent. A better
understanding of how the contract operates in these settings will surely help
146 But see Radin, supra note 1.
147. See, e.g., Bohan v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 366 F.3d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 2004); Lloyd v.
MBNA Am. Bank, 27 F. App'x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2002); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36
Cal. 4th 148, 175 (2005) (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
148. Scheifley v. Capitol One Bank, No. CV 03-2801RBL (W.D. Wash. filed June 25,
2004).
149. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 1.
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) and U.C.C. § 2-207 are two
exceptions. Together they offer strong evidence of the law's failure here.
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to improve advocacy involving these provisions in business form settings
and thereby lead to richer judicial decisions.
When deployed by out-of-state businesses, widespread choice-of-law
and forum clauses threaten the consumer and small business protection a
state offers to its residents. This may be of concern to some state
legislatures. If a choice-of-forum clause blocks a local suit, or drags the
citizen to a distant jurisdiction, what began as an uneven playing field','
becomes even more tilted. If a choice-of-law clause can effectively replace
the resident's consumer protection with that of a state that offers less, we
are faced with a major issue of federalism and local control. 5 2 Legislative
action may be even more pressing inasmuch as a great deal of consumer
law displacement could be occurring out of sight, in negotiations and
151. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc. REv. 95 (1974).
152. The policy questions may well go to the core of our Federal system.
How much consumer protection a State supplies to its citizens vis A vis its
businesses is, obviously, the product of a very complicated political process. Delaware,
which has prided itself on creating a favorable business environment, no doubt derives tax
revenues from businesses that settle there and it can thereby redistribute that revenue to its
citizens in the form of lower taxes or other State benefits. One can imagine a political
process that "trades" some level of consumer protection for a favorable business
environment and the benefits to a State that come from that. A beauty of our Federal
system is that another State could have a completely different "mix," choosing instead to
offer citizens legal protections unavailable elsewhere even if the business environment is not
so favorable. The system works the way it is designed so long as citizens of given places
get the "mix" that their State delivers.
This Federal balance can be upset if part of the "mix" citizens get in one state is
replaced with part of the "mix" developed in a different state. Assume, for purposes of
illustration what many business lobbyists assert, that a state's consumer protection and its
tax level are correlated, that is, people who live in "high" consumer protection states get
"high" taxes as part of the tradeoff and people who live in "low" consumer protection states
get "low" taxes as their tradeoff. Whether either hypothetical tradeoff is "good" is beside
the point; both mixes are appropriate in our political system and, indeed, the system fosters
such differences. Now suppose the citizens in the "high" consumer protection state can
have their consumer protection replaced (through choice of law provisions) with the "low"
state's level. Now, the citizens of the high tax state get a balance (low consumer protection
and high taxes) that neither state legislature made. While the "low" regulation state might
even foster such a result to make it even more attractive to businesses, cf DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 4.102(b) (1999) (requiring Delaware banks to use the law of Delaware in their
transactions with customers in other states), such a result seems seriously at odds with our
Federal system.
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arbitrations that leave no records. An undeveloped-or wrong-judicial
decision can have influence in that "echo chamber" for years. In such a
legal environment, clear statutory norms are probably the most effective
vehicles for controlling the undesirable byproducts of the widespread
recognition of these provisions.
With adhesive business forms, the issues are predominantly contract
issues (the parties' relationship to one another) rather than conflicts issues
(the parties' collective authority vis d vis the State). Contracts are not all
the same and, while contract scholars have not done a great job of it, they
have been focusing on what differentiates adhesion deals from negotiated
contracts for many years. These particular adhesive contract provisions,
too, deserve more attention than they have had from contracts scholars if
we want full, rich policy development of appropriate limits (if any) to put
on such provisions in given contexts. Can a choice-of-law or forum clause
be considered "unconscionable" if its effect is to deprive a plaintiff of a
class action remedy? Might the hidden effects of a choice-of-law provision
violate a customer's "reasonable expectations?" 153 Are choice-of-law or
forum clauses binding if packed in with the product and seen, if at all, only
after purchase? 154 Are they enforceable if they appear in browseware? 155
What if they arrive in a bill stuffer after the initial relationship is
established?1 56 None of these contract law questions is even asked if we
simply assume that the contract for law or forum is binding and move to a
conflicts analysis.
Put simply, contract law offers unrealized potential for understanding
contracts for law, forum, and arbitration. Seeing the contract more clearly
within these provisions is a first step; one can only hope that a better, richer
policy discussion will follow.
153. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
154. Compare Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (D. Kan. 2000) with Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997).
155. Cf Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
156. Cf Badie v. Bank of America, 67 Cal. App. 4th 779 (1998).
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